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1Abstract
This paper explores the eﬀect of religious observance and aﬃliation to
the dominant religion (Catholicism) on trust in institutions, towards others
and market attitudes. The analysis is performed using a Latin American
database of twenty thousand respondents from 2004 by means of ordered
probit models. The most interesting results are:
i) Trust toward others is positively correlated with religious observance
and with Catholic aﬃliation.
ii)T h e r ei sapositive correlation between trust in the government, in
the police, in the armed forces, in the judiciary and in the banking system
and religious practice in general. Identical positive results are obtained for
Catholic aﬃliation.
iii) Correlations with attitudes toward the market, in general, are hetero-
geneous but never negative.
In sum, individual’s level of religiosity crucially aﬀects trust in institu-
tions and toward peers. We also found that Catholicism encourages both
trust in institutions and towards others. Thus, we found a positive eﬀect
of “religiosity” on social capital. In fact, we never found any negative (and
signiﬁcant) eﬀect on the variables considered.
Keywords: trust in institutions, economic behavior, religious practise,
Catholics.
JEL Cl as s. : Z12, Z13.
21 Introduction
In very recent years, and after a long period of neglect, the economic pro-
fession has begun to devote increasing attention to religion. This “emerg-
ing” discipline, known as the Economics of Religion, has two prominent ap-
proaches: the economic analysis of religious behavior within an economic
model and the study of the consequences of religion and religiosity on eco-
nomic behavior. This paper falls within the second sphere.1
The eﬀect of any religious frame on economic behavior is not a trivial
issue. Imagine for instance a religion which imposes constraints upon in-
dividuals2 and that this restriction might aﬀect economic behavior. In this
case, the whole economic system would then be driven by such an institution.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales [10] note that there is something intrinsic to
certain religions that constrains subjects and inhibits economic growth.
The relationship between religion and education and human capital in-
vestment has been the most prominent research topic. In a seminal work,
Azzi—Ehremberg [2] used a classical intertemporal choice model to show the
negative eﬀect of education on churchgoing according to the secularization
hypothesis3, which predicts the negative eﬀect of education on religious ac-
tivities. However, recent empirical studies show both positive and negative
eﬀects of schooling and education on religious activity (and vice versa). A
clear example of these controversial results is the work by Shoshana Neuman.
In her work on Israelis, Neuman [12] shows a negative inﬂuence of religiosity
on education. Yet with Brañas-Garza [6] for Spaniards, she illustrates just
the opposite eﬀect (a positive correlation between education and religion) for
Spanish Catholics.
According to Sacerdote and Glaeser [17], there are positive spillover eﬀects
of religion on education given that religious participation enlarges network-
ing. Education increases the returns from network participation and other
forms of social capital4, thus, more highly educated people participate more
1The list is not exhaustive. A third line of research might include the study of reli-
gious markets, while a fourth could be related to Religious Economics in the normative
sense. The most obvious example regarding the latter is Islamic Economics, although the
Association of Christian Economists (ACE) also follows similar motivations.
2An obvious example could be the Koranic precept (al—Qur’an 30:39) which prohibits
charging Muslims interest rates (ghara).
3See also Rodney Stark and Roger Finke [18], among others, for ideas on secularization.
4Although the scope of social capital varies considerably in the literature, a broad deﬁ-
nition of the concept refers to “the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values
3in social church—related activities. Barro and McCleary [3] oﬀer a diﬀerent
explanation based on the idea that both religious belief and scientiﬁca n a l y -
sis require a considerable degree of abstraction. Thus, more highly educated
people would also be more able or willing to use such reasoning to support
religious beliefs and would therefore be more religious.
Putnam [16] explains economic experiences in Italy by the lack of trust
toward others that presumably characterizes the Catholic tradition. Follow-
ing these ideas, other authors like La Porta et al. [13] and Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales [10] (GSZ hereafter) open another window: the role of indi-
vidual religious attitudes on social capital. Based on the idea that subjects’
attitudes toward institutions and/or rules aﬀect their (economic) behavior
and decisions and therefore aﬀect economic performance in general, GSZ
conduct an international analysis for 64 countries in which they explore how
beliefs, religious activity and denominations are related to several forms of
social capital. Although they found heterogeneous results in this sense, they
support a clear link between social capital and religion.
Our goal is to obtain (robust) empirical evidence which supports the
notion that individual religiosity reinforces individual trust attitudes and so
reinforces “the economic link” idea. Thus, we do not try to test if social
capital positively aﬀects economic performance. On the contrary, we assume
the positive spillover of social capital on economic performance to be a given.
We examine the link between subjects’ religiosity and trust in ﬁve key
institutions (the government, the police, the armed forces, the judiciary and
banks) and trust toward others (interpersonal trust). We also introduce other
variables such as individual’s view about the economic system, private ﬁrms
and markets.
This paper oﬀers evidence for one of the largest and most convulsive
markets of religion. The Latinobarómetro —a survey that explores social val-
ues in Latin America—5 shows that in 2004 the religious market was basi-
cally dominated by the Catholic denomination. From a whole sample of
19,372 individuals, 72% declare themselves to be Catholics, 15% are Evan-
gelical/Protestants, 3% belong to other religions (including: Jehovah’s Wit-
that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social develop-
ment” (World Bank [19]) “by reducing transaction costs, promoting cooperative behaviour,
diﬀusing knowledge and innovations, and through enhancements to personal well-being and
associated spill-overs” (Productivity Commission [15]).
5The Latinobarómetro survey has been conducted annually since 1995 by the Latino-
barómetro Corporation, a private non-proﬁt organization located in Santiago, Chile.
4nesses 0.9%, Adventists 0.6%, Mormons 0.5%, Jewish 0.1%, Afro-American
Cults, Umbanda, etc. 0.3%), while 10% have no religious aﬃliation (includ-
ing believers1.6%, agnostics/atheists 1.2% and none 7.6%). Among those
who declare a religious aﬃliation, these percentages reach as high as 80% for
Catholics and 16.6% for Evangelical/Protestants. These ﬁgures are shown in
Table 1 below.
Table 1: Religious markets in Latinamerica, 2004
Although Catholicism is the dominant religion throughout Latin America,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Colombia and Argentina are, in this order,
the most predominantly Catholic nations of our sample: more than 80% of all
respondents profess this religion (about 90% if we only consider people who
declare some religious aﬃliation). Mexico, Peru and Bolivia also exhibit high
levels of Catholic observance in their religion markets. On the other hand,
Uruguay, El Salvador and Honduras present the lowest fraction of Catholic
people among their population (little more than 50%).
The evangelical denomination represents an important and increasingly
large fraction of the religion market in Guatemala, Honduras and El Sal-
vador (about 30%), although Catholicism remains the dominant religion. In
general, the evangelical churches in the region have experienced a leap in
growth in recent decades that has been accompanied by a decline in the
number of adherents to the Catholic faith.
Following Barro and McCleary [3], we used the Herﬁndahl index6 of ad-
herence to the main religious denominations as a measure of religious con-
centration. To build this index only three religious denominations were con-
sidered : Catholic, Evangelical/Protestant and other religions. When hj =1
(j =1 ,...,18 countries) the whole population within a country belongs to the
same religion (religious monopoly). In contrast, hj =0means that each in-
dividual practices his own religion (a large number of denominations without
any market power).
6The Herﬁndahl index is deﬁned as the sum of the squares of the fractions belonging to
each religion and can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected persons
in a country belong to the same religion. The index was constructed considering only
those respondents professing some religion.
5The last column in Table 1 shows that Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala
and Nicaragua have the most competitive religious markets in the region due
to the important “market share” held by the Evangelical/Protestant denom-
ination. On the other hand, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Paraguay,
followed by Ecuador and Argentina —the most predominantly Catholic Latin
American countries— exhibit the most concentrated markets, with 10% (or
even less) of respondents out of the main club!
In sum, religious markets are always concentrated (hj > 0.5 ∀j)a n d ,
apparently, any diﬀerences in concentration levels are not due to variations
in the Catholic share, but mainly arise from the increasing importance of
other Christian denominations.
Observation 1 Catholicism is the dominant religion throughout Latin Amer-
ica in the sense of GSZ.
The latter observation means that the Catholic religion is the most promi-
nent club within these societies. This is not trivial because networking ben-
eﬁts or pure AE’s “consumption motives” arising from religious practice
—churchgoing for instance— are much larger within this denomination (see
Sacerdote and Glaeser [17]).
Finally, the level of religious practice is also remarkable. Of the 17,579
individuals (90% of the sample) who declared themselves to have some re-
ligious aﬃliation7, 2,217 (12.6%) are very observant; 6,088 (34.6%) are ob-
servant and 7,155 (40.7%) are not very observant. 1,976 subjects (11.2%)
declared themselves to be non-observant, while the remaining 143 did not
answer or did not know.
Based on the above information, we use two key variables to capture the
importance of the religious factor within social capital measurements. On the
one hand, subject’s religiosity level is the answer given by individuals to the
question “how observant are you?”: very observant (value =4 ); observant
(value =3 ); not too observant (value =2 ); not observant (value =1 ).
Observe that our measure is not restricted to any religious aﬃliation, just to
religious practice.
On the other hand, aﬃliation to the dominant religion is captured by a
dummy which labels those individuals who declared themselves Catholics.
We explore the Latin American database using ordered probit models.
The ﬁrst part of the analysis uses only the variable religious practice while
7The remaining 1,793 declared that they had no religious aﬃliation.
6ignoring any religious denomination. We use two types of approaches: a ﬁxed
eﬀect panel (model 1) that labels subjects’ country and a second analysis
which ignores the name of the country (model 2), but includes both the
GDP and the Gini Index of the country where the respondent resides.
The second part of the analysis controls Catholic bias b yu s i n gad u m m y
which labels Catholic aﬃliations. The most interesting results are summa-
rized as follows:
i) Trust toward others seems to be correlated with religious practice (once
we control for Catholics). In contrast to other previous literature (see Putnam
[16] or La Porta et al. [13]), the sign of Catholic aﬃliation is also positive
(and signiﬁcant).
ii)T h e r ei sapositive correlation between trust in the government, in the
police and in the judiciary and religious practice in general. Trust in the
armed forces and in the banking system depends on the model speciﬁcation.
iii) Correlations between religious practice (or Catholic aﬃliation) and
attitudes toward the market system, the role of the market and private ﬁrms
are heterogeneous but never negative.
In sum, individual’s level of religiosity crucially aﬀects trust in institutions
and is correlated with trust toward others8. Catholic aﬃliation gives similar
results and it is also correlated with trust toward others. Our collection of
variables never shows any (signiﬁcant) negative eﬀect for religion.
Hence, this paper shows, at least, the initial pieces of the puzzle which
links religion and social capital. Our results are given for religious practice
(regardless of religious aﬃliation) and also controlled for the Catholic de-
nomination. This is important because it separates Catholic bias from pure
eﬀects arising from personal involvement in any religion.
2H y p o t h e s e s
The underlying assumption throughout this paper is that subjects’ trust in
institutions and/or rules aﬀects their (economic) behavior and decisions and
therefore aﬀects economic performance in general. Our goal is to obtain
empirical evidence which supports the hypothesis that individual religious
attitudes reinforce individual trust attitudes, thus reinforcing the ideas behind
this assumption. Hence, we do not try to test if social capital positively
8Insofar as we did not analyze the opposite causality direction, the results reported
here should be interpreted as correlations, not as causal eﬀects.
7aﬀects economic performance, but, on the contrary, assume that the positive
spillover of social capital on economic performance is a given. We impose
this assumption as a necessary requirement to continue the paper.
Assumption 2 Both trust in individuals and institutions positively aﬀect
economic performance and growth.
In line with Guiso et al. [10] (GSZ), the aim of this paper is to explore
t h er o l eo ft h er e l i g i o u sf a c t o ro ne c o n o m i cb e h a v i o r .O u ro b j e c t i v eh e r ei s
to determine whether more religious subjects (regardless of their religious
denomination) are willing to be more trusting than other less religious indi-
viduals. In sum, our main goal is to:
Objective 3 (main) Analyze the eﬀect of individual’s level of religious prac-
tice on several measures of social capital.
Independently of the above objective, we also study the eﬀect of religiosity
on attitudes toward the market and the economic system.
We use a database which contains information gathered from 19,372 in-
dividuals from 18 Latin American countries (see section 3 below, page 10).
The use of individual data from several countries allows us to “control” na-
tional eﬀects (for instance, subject’s trust in a country’s government might
be aﬀected by the real honest conduct of such a country). In the ﬁrst part
of the analysis we focus our attention on religious practice irregardless of the
religious denomination.
In sum, we check if religious practice (which might or might not aﬀect
these national considerations) aﬀects social capital indicators. Before con-
tinuing, let us deﬁne our key concepts.
Deﬁnition 4 (Horizontal Trust) Trust in individuals is the anticipation
of reciprocity (Bolle [5]).
What Bolle refers to in the above deﬁnition is that when somebody trusts
in another it is because he is anticipating a reciprocal behavior. An individual
will help others because he believes others will do likewise in the future.
Experimental evidence shows that subjects’ trust towards others is not so
great (see for instance Cox [8]).
Let us now focus on institutional trust. Departing from Bolle’s [5] def-
inition, we introduce some modiﬁcations in order to achieve the following
idea:
8Deﬁnition 5 (Vertical Trust) Trust in institutions and rules is the antic-
ipation of institutional good conduct.
Thus, individuals trust in institutions (and rules) when they expect that
these institutions will be honestly driven. Then, we understand this sort of
trust as the probability individuals give to honest conduct.
Recall that the key question is to connect religion to economic perfor-
mance through social capital. For Barro and McCleary [3], the link between
religion and economic performance is direct insofar as they claim that both
religious belief and scientiﬁc work require a considerable degree of abstrac-
tion. They consider that more highly educated people would also be more
able or willing to use such reasoning to support religious beliefs.
For us, the key idea is not about complex thinking but just beliefs. We
suppose that subjects trust in institutions in much the same way as they
believe in God. Hence we link religion to vertical trust. Assuming that sub-
jects consider the government (or the judiciary or whatever) as the conductor
of earthly issues and God as the conductor of celestial issues, then we ex-
pect a correlation between both beliefs. It seems sensible to think that an
individual who gives a large ex-ante value to the latter will give an analo-
gous value to the former. In other words, supra—worldly feelings and trust
in supra—individual institutions might be correlated. Assuming this idea we
conjecture that:
Conjecture 6 More religious subjects are willing to believe in higher and
superior abstract authorities.
Then,
Corollary 7 There is a positive correlation between vertical (subjects vs.
institutions) trust and religious attitudes.
In sum, we expect that more religious individuals will show a larger ver-
tical trust (toward institutions).
Following Guiso et al. [10], we expect to observe positive correlations
between horizontal trust and subject religiosity. In fact, when using an in-
ternational pool, GSZ ﬁnd the above correlation (religiosity vs. horizontal
trust) to be positive.
Thus far we have not mentioned any religious denomination. However,
our sample is crowded with practising Catholics so, obviously, this fact must
be considered.
9In a study on Italian Catholics, Putnam [16] attributes the prevailing
lack of trust toward others in southern Italy to the country’s strong Catholic
tradition. Putnam remarks that the Catholic tradition enlarges the verti-
cal bond with the Church by undermining the horizontal bond with fellow
citizens. Interestingly, in his cross—country analysis, La Porta et al.[ 1 3 ]
ﬁnd some evidence for this theory. Also, GSZ partially support Putnam’s
ideas by showing that the Catholic group is endowed with a smaller level of
horizontal trust as compared to other Christian groups.
Thus, the papers referred to above indicate that horizontal trust and
Catholic denomination (dummy) must be nearly uncorrelated (GSZ) or, to
go even further, must be negatively correlated (Putnam). We will check this
fact in the second part of section 4.
In short, throughout the next sections we will explore the eﬀect of indi-
vidual religiosity on several measures of social capital. Speciﬁcally, we will
check if individual religiosity aﬀects both vertical and horizontal trust and
ﬁnally, we will study the Catholic bias.
Objective 8 Explore the role of Catholic aﬃl i a t i o no ns o c i a lc a p i t a l .
This last objective allows us to check the hypothesis proposed by Putnam
[16] and revise the results reported in GSZ.
3 Database and Methodology
Our empirical research was conducted using data from 18 Latin American
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela). The data source
was the Latinobarómetro Survey (2004) which provides information about
individuals’ opinions, attitudes, behaviors, values, and socio-demographic
characteristics (including religious aﬃliation and practices).
The social capital measures regarding individuals’ attitudes, which are
used as dependent variables in our models, were based on the following ques-
tions:
• Horizontal trust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted (1) or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with
people (0)?
10• Vertical trust:H o wm u c hc o n ﬁdence do you have in each of these in-
stitutions (government, police, armed forces, judiciary, banks): a great
deal of conﬁdence (4), quite a lot of conﬁdence (3), not very much
conﬁdence (2), or none at all (1)?
• Attitude toward the market system (“system”): Generally speaking,
would you say that you are very satisﬁed (4), quite satisﬁed (3), not
very satisﬁed (2) or not at all satisﬁed (1) with how the market economy
performs in your country?
• For each of the following statements, can you tell me how much you
agree with each (strongly agree (4), agree (3), disagree (2) or strongly
disagree (1))?: i) the market economy (“market”) is the only system
which will lead to the development of the the country; ii)p r i v a t eﬁrms
(“firm”) are essential to the country’s development.
We also included variables related to the characteristics of individuals and
countries:
• Health: In the last twelve months, would you say that your physical
health has been very good (1), good (2), fair (3), bad (4), very bad (5).
• Socio-demographic variables: gender, age, marital status, education.9
• Deprivation index (dindex) built by considering the ownership of sev-
eral goods: television, refrigerator, home, computer, washing machine,
telephone, car, second home for holidays, drinking water and hot water.
• Country characteristics: per capita GDP and Gini Index.
• Subject religious practice10 (4 levels as deﬁn e do np a g e6 )
9Omitted values are Edu1 (illiterate) and Edu2 (incomplete primary education). The
remaining values are: Edu3 (primary education); Edu4 (incomplete secondary education),
Edu5 (secondary education), Edu6 (incomplete higher education), Edu7 (higher educa-
tion).
10Observe that we use religious practice as a proxy of subject religiousity. Although
the transfer seems sensible we must not overlook the fact that recent papers use both
attendance to mass and praying as proxies of religiosity (see Brañas—Garza and Neuman,
[7]).
11Our purpose is to determine to what extent the diﬀerent characteristics
of individuals -in particular, their level of religious observance- aﬀect the
formation of horizontal and vertical trust and attitudes towards ﬁrms and
the market economy. In order to do so we estimate diﬀerent ordered probit
models.
The phenomenon to be modeled is discrete. The latent or unobserved
variable is y∗, level of trust/attitude of individuals, which is related to inde-
pendent observed variables (xi):
y
∗ = xiβ + εi
The variable y∗ is divided into two, three or four ordinal categories (de-
pending on the question asked):
yi = mτ m−1 ≤ y
∗
i ≤ τm
where m =1 ,2,3 and τ1 and τ2 are estimated.








For instance, given a value of x, the probability of trust or distrust (y =2 ,
in the case of three ranks) corresponds to the distribution region where y∗
lies between τ1 and τ2:
Pr(y =2 |x)=P r ( τ1 ≤ y
∗
i <τ 2|x)
The standard formula for the predicted probability in the ordinal models
is:
Pr(y =1 |x)=F(τ2 − xβ) − F(τ1 − xβ)
Assuming that F(.) is the normal distribution (with errors variance equal
to one), ordered probit models are estimated.
The parameters estimated in these models do not provide direct informa-
tion to understand the relationship between independent and latent variables
12(Long y Freese [14]). Generally, substantive interpretations are based on the
prediction of probabilities and the functions of those probabilities11. These
predictions are carried out for diﬀerent groups of persons and the marginal
eﬀects of independent variables are estimated12.
In our case, we estimate two models for each dependent variable. The
ﬁrst one (model 1) includes country ﬁxed eﬀects using a dummy variable for
each one (with the Dominican Republic as the omitted country). In the other
estimation (model 2), the dummy variable is substituted by the countries’
socio-economic characteristics (per capita GDP and Gini Index).
It is important to note now what contributions this paper makes to the
previous literature, mainly GSZ [10]. This paper diﬀers from GSZ in a num-
ber of ways: i) we use ordered probit models instead of OLS regression; ii)
we use data arising from a new survey, the Latinobarómetro, carried out in
2004; iii) we capture religiosity through religious practice (categorical vari-
able) instead of various religious indicators; iv) our variables regarding the
market are diﬀerent (due to the database) and we support evidence for trust
in the banking system, and lastly, v)w ee s t i m a t et w od i ﬀerent speciﬁcations
regarding the individual country instead of just one.
Our results are shown in the next sections.
4 Religious practice and social capital
In this section we explore the eﬀect of religious practice (regardless of denom-
ination) on social capital measures. Recall that we estimate the determinants
of several social capital indicators (trust or satisfaction, see section 3, page 9)
and according to our speciﬁcation, religious practice is just one of the inde-
pendent variables within the models. Before reporting the results regarding
the religious factor, we analyze the set of variables used as the “control”.
Remember that we use Type 1 models (with countries) -reported in table 2a-
and Type 2 models (without country labels but including national GDP and
the Gini index) -reported in Table 2b.
Interestingly, gender seems to be uncorrelated with both horizontal and
vertical trust -with the exception of trust in the judiciary. There is strong
evidence suggesting a gender bias towards the judiciary in the sense that
11We use the programs developed by Long and Freese [14] and the command mfx.
12If the independent variable is binary, the marginal eﬀect will be the shift from not
having a certain characteristic to having it.
13males clearly support this institution to a much larger degree. Gender is
also correlated with attitudes toward the economic system, the market and
private ﬁrms. The latter indicates that males are more pro-competitive!
Age shows a signiﬁcant role in both vertical and horizontal trust, al-
though the eﬀects are not symmetrical. For instance, old individuals trust
more in peers and in the government, but they trust less in the armed forces,
the judiciary and banks. However, they seem to be satisﬁed with the market
system.
The role of education is heterogeneous as well. Generally speaking,
education is uncorrelated with horizontal trust and the higher the education,
the larger the vertical trust. Nonetheless, there are a number of exceptions:
highly educated people trust more in peers; trust in the government is nega-
tively correlated and trust in the police is uncorrelated with education. It is
also interesting to observe that when we control for socio-economic variables
regarding the country (Table 2b), highly educated subjects display a negative
view about the market and the system, but support the role of private ﬁrms.
Health is deﬁnitely a key factor. In almost all the cases (in both models
1 and 2) bad health translates into a diminishing level of both vertical and
horizontal trust, and, also, a negative view about the market! Thus, when a
subject suﬀers health problems his view about everything is rather negative.
Single status also has consequences on trust. Single subjects are more
trusting of peers and have a positive view of the economic system. In contrast,
single status is nearly uncorrelated with vertical trust.
The deprivation index is positively correlated with horizontal trust.
Hence social status has a negative eﬀect on trust toward others. This index
is negatively correlated with the armed forces and, as expected, with the
banking system. The Gini index shows similar results to those reported by
the deprivation index insofar as the Gini index shows that large polarization
decreases horizontal and vertical trust and negatively aﬀects attitudes toward
markets. Analogously, larger per capita GDP increases vertical trust (with
the exception of trust in the armed forces and banks) and is uncorrelated with
horizontal trust.
Table 2 below shows the complete set of estimations for each social capital
measure, including a “religious practice” variable.
insert Table 2a about here
14insert Table 2b about here
The results shown in both tables indicate that the role of religious prac-
tice is ambiguous in some cases (signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in model 1 but not
in model 2 or inversely). But they also show that there is a number of cor-
relations which consistently appear to be signiﬁcant regardless of the model.
This is the case of trust in the government, the police and the judiciary. The
same also applies to satisfaction with the economic system and the role of
the market. On the contrary, estimations regarding horizontal trust do not
appear to be signiﬁcant in any model. In sum,
a) Horizontal trust is not correlated with religious practice (neither in model
1, nor in model 2).
b) There is a positive correlation between trust in the government, in the
police and in the judiciary and religious practice.
c) T h e r ei sapositive correlation between a positive attitude toward the mar-
ket system and satisfaction and religious practice.
d) The correlation between religious practice and trust in the banking system
and in the armed forces and a positive view of private ﬁrms is only
signiﬁcant when the country label is not considered.
Observe that, as expected, there is a positive correlation between vertical
trust and religious practice (corollary 7), but we do not ﬁnd support for the
correlation between horizontal trust and religious practise (regardless of the
denomination) shown in GSZ. However, the ﬁrst idea is partially satisﬁed
because we observe a positive correlation with some, but not all, measures
of vertical trust. Interestingly, model 2 indicates that corollary 7 is fully
satisﬁed when the country’s label is omitted. The latter might suggest that
more religious individuals “achieve” vertical trust when the real performance
of their own national institutions —for instance the banking system—i sn o t
considered. What we observe is that, in some cases, national institutions
discourage subjects!
After a preliminary analysis without regard to any religious denomination,
we now control for the Catholic aﬃliation. Although there is a number
of denominations in Latin America (see Table 1, page 5), there is a vast
15majority of Catholics within the sample. What we will check now is whether
the Catholic label (we use a dummy with value 1 for Catholics) varies the
results, that is, we will test the Catholic bias (very reduced for GSZ [10] and
negative for Putnam [16]). For purposes of simpliﬁcation, we restrict our
analysis to the ﬁxed eﬀect models for countries (model 1). Hence, the only
diﬀerence between Table 3 and the set of estimations reported in Table 2a is
the dummy variable which controls the Catholic bias.
insert Table 3 about here
Let us ﬁrst focus on vertical trust. Surprisingly, we observe that when we
control by means of a Catholic dummy, all the vertical trust measures show
a positive and signiﬁcant correlation with religious practice. Hence, when we
control aﬃliation to the dominant religion then all the coeﬃcients regarding
vertical trust appear as signiﬁcant and positive. We may summarize these
r e s u l t sa sf o l l o w s :
Result 1: Vertical trust in the government, the police, the judiciary, the
armed forces and banks is correlated to religious practice.
Result 2: There is positive a correlation between all the measures of vertical
trust and Catholic aﬃliation.
Observe that the above results are even stronger than those reported in
the previous section. Religious practice is deﬁnitely positive for all measures
of vertical trust and, under assumption 1, for economic development.
Another interesting result is the positive sign of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
in all the cases. Thus, we f o u n dn on e g a t i v ee ﬀect of religious activity on
any of the measures of social capital considered, regardless of the religious
denomination. Identical ideas are applicable to the Catholic denomination.
Thus, in a wide sense, individual’s religious practice positively aﬀects vertical
trust in all the cases.
Remark 9 (conjecture 1) Corollary 7 is satisﬁed as there is a positive
correlation between religious attitudes and vertical trust.
We will now check horizontal trust. The most prominent ideas we extract
from Table 3 are:
16Result 3: There is a positive (but weak) correlation between religious prac-
tice (controlling for Catholics) and horizontal trust.
Result 4: There is a positive correlation between Catholic aﬃliation and
horizontal trust.
Both results are quite remarkable. On the one hand, we can say that reli-
gious practice per se (or the practice of any non-dominant religion) is a pos-
itive determinant of horizontal trust. On the other hand, Catholic practice
(or membership in a dominant religion) also increases trust toward others.
Another salient result is that the Catholic bias is twice as relevant,a n dm o r e
signiﬁcant, than religious practice (0.7 vs 0.3). This means that Catholicism
reinforces horizontal trust more than other religions13. In contrast to Put-
nam, we observe a positive eﬀect of Catholic aﬃliation on horizontal trust.
Regarding GSZ we see that the Catholic bias is not minor.
R e c a l lt h a tt h el a t t e ri st r u ef o r1 8c o u n t r i e si nw h i c ht h eC a t h o l i cr e l i g i o n
is dominant.
Remark 10 Catholic aﬃliation reinforces the link between religiosity and
social capital.
Finally, the eﬀect of religiosity on attitudes toward the market system
is heterogeneous. We observe that “market” and “system” are positively
correlated with religious practice but “ﬁrm” is uncorrelated. The role of
Catholic aﬃliation is even more ambiguous. There is a weak correlation
between Catholicism (or individuals belonging to the dominant religion) and
satisfaction with the market system. Remember that the weberian thesis
neglects the role of the Catholics in economic development. While our result
does not support this, nor does it ﬁnd evidence to the contrary . In sum, we
can conclude:
Result 5: The correlation between religiosity and market attitudes is not
so evident but is never negative.
Finally, observe that the eﬀect of religiosity (both practice and Catholic
denomination) is never negative in vertical or horizontal trust nor in attitudes
toward the market.
13At this point we must recall the idea of dominant religion. There are no examples of
Catholics within a non—Catholic country.
17Remark 11 Religious practice and Catholicism positively aﬀect social capi-
tal and thus reinforce the spillover of social capital on economic performance.
Now we compare our results with those reported by GSZ [10]. We found
identical results regarding the positive eﬀe c to fr e l i g i o s i t yon horizontal trust
and vertical trust in the police, the armed forces, governments and the le-
gal system (represented here by the judiciary). However, we also ﬁnd some
discrepancies. In particular, there are two key diﬀerences: i)w h e r e a sG S Z
support a small Catholic bias for horizontal trust, we ﬁnd a “strong” cor-
relation, ii) whereas GSZ support a negative eﬀect of religion on attitudes
toward competition14 we do not (recall that we did not ﬁnd any negative sign
of correlation).
Why do we ﬁnd these diﬀerences? They can be explained by two potential
sources: the method and the data set. Technically, our method (Ordered
Probit) seems to be more appropriate than the method used by GSZ (OLS).
However, the data sets are completely incomparable. While GSZ uses the
World Values Surveys (a large, well-known database), we use a new data set
that only covers Latin American countries and just one wave. This last fact
leads us to hypothesize that at least part of the diﬀerences arise from the
sample, not only from the database. Our survey was conducted at the same
time following identical procedures in 18 neighboring countries. We consider
that this is an important factor given that the relevant set of variables at
hand has a very similar signiﬁcance in these countries.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Following the idea that religion may aﬀect economic performance through its
eﬀect on individual’s attitudes, we explored the role of religious practice and
Catholic aﬃliation on several attitudes related to social capital that might
foster economic growth. The analysis, which was carried out using data from
18 Latin American countries, showed a positive correlation between religion
and most of the attitudes considered.
We found that trust toward others (horizontal trust) is positively corre-
lated with religious practice and much more so with Catholic aﬃliation. As
regards trust in institutions (vertical trust), our results show that there is a
positive relationship between subjects’ level of religiosity and their trust in
14Although the competition measure used by GSZ diﬀers from ours.
18ﬁve key institutions (the government, the police, the armed forces, the judi-
ciary and banks). We also introduced variables related to market attitudes,
ﬁnding that their correlation with religiosity is not so evident, although it is
never negative.
In light of these results, this paper ﬁts the initial pieces into the puzzle
linking religion and social capital, and by doing so, demonstrates the connec-
tion between religion and economic performance. However, in order to con-
clude that religion aﬀects social capital and therefore reinforces the spillover
of social capital on economic performance, further research is needed. In par-
ticular, it would be necessary to investigate the inverse causality direction
between religion and the attitudes considered.
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Table 1: Religious markets in Latinamerica, 2004 
 
Country  Catholic  Evangelical/Protestant  Other  No religion Herfindahl index 
Argentina 82.4%  7.8% 1.9%  7.9%  0.809 
Bolivia 76.6% 17.7% 2.9%  2.9%  0.656 
Brazil 69.8%  19.0%  4.7% 6.5%  0.601 
Chile 66.3%  13.9%  1.8% 18.1%  0.683 
Colombia 82.8%  2.3%  2.1%  12.8%  0.902 
Costa Rica  65.4%  20.7% 2.7%  11.2%  0.598 
Dominican Rep.  70.3%  13.4% 4.0%  12.3%  0.668 
Ecuador 85.5%  8.2% 1.8%  4.5%  0.810 
Guatemala 58.6%  31.8% 2.3%  7.3%  0.518 
Honduras 55.1%  32.0% 2.4%  10.5%  0.508 
Mexico 79.4%  4.4%  1.3%  14.9%  0.873 
Nicaragua 63.6%  25.9% 3.1%  7.4%  0.551 
Panama 80.6%  15.4%  2.3% 1.8%  0.698 
Paraguay 84.6%  6.0%  2.2%  7.2%  0.835 
Peru 79.0%  13.3%  5.7%  2.0%  0.672 
Salvador 53.5%  29.0% 2.7%  14.8%  0.511 
Uruguay 52.9%  6.4% 3.7%  37.0%  0.720 
Venezuela 85.8%  6.1% 2.0%  6.1%  0.840 
Total 71.9%  14.9%  2.8% 10.4%  0.673 
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Obs.  16,557  16,866  16,927  16,598 16,571 16,598  15,416  14,843  15,590 Table 2b: Social capital equations (Model 2) 
 
  Horizontal T.  Vertical Trust  Attitudes 
  Toward others  Govern  Police  Army  Judiciary Banks  System  Market  Firm 

















































































































































































































































 Table 3: Social capital equations controlled by Catholics (model 1) 
 
  Horizontal 
Trust  Vertical Trust  Attitudes 
Variable  Toward 
others  Govern Police Army Judiciary Banks System Market  Firm 
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